Introduction
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Religion can be a strong driver for taking collective action, as illustrated by individuals and groups of believers taking faith-based action on issues of welfare and social justice (Cloke, Beaumont and Williams 2013; Beaumont and Cloke 2012; Bäckström et al. 2011) , or by terrorist groups inspired by fundamentalist interpretations of a particular religion. In this article, we want to explore how Muslims in Sweden relate their faith to social life in their neighbourhood, in their home town/city, and in society in general, i.e., a question of place identity on different scales (see Pile 2010, 15 ). Irrespective of scale and level, identity formation is a process and not a fixed category. Such processes are linked to self-perception, choices, and social structures, but could also be complemented by or based on a particular territory, such as a neighbourhood or an entire city. Some people identify with their region while others see themselves as cosmopolitans -connected to a variety of cultures all over the world. All these identifications could be complemented by identification with a nation. (Andersson 2011, 35) Given the lack of systematic research on Muslims in Sweden, 2 our approach is exploratory, illustrating the way some Muslim imams, other community leaders and "everyday makers"
(this term will be explained in a separate section later in this article), identifying themselves as Muslims express an orientation towards finding ways of relating Islam to perceived Swedish culture and traditions without losing their Muslim identity.
Faith-based action can take different forms, depending on the interpretation of Islam, or any other religion, that is adopted. In a study of the political psychology of globalization and Muslims in the West, this article identifies three ideal type strategies of identity formation among Muslims: essentialism, engagement and "retreatism" (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking 2011, 12) . An essentialist interpretation indicates vigorous proselytization, sometimes even including a propensity to use violence to spread the message, whereas an open-minded, although engaged interpretation favours of mutual understanding and dialogue with other religions and even with non-believers. The retreat-orientated stance means keeping faith as a purely personal thing, more or less invisible when leaving the household sphere, i.e. not including an explicit attempt to win the souls of non-believers. 3 Illustrating the difference between a clear-cut retreatist stance and an engaged but non-violent position, a Swedish journalist recently reported on recurrent conversations with an old Jewish woman who had reacted strongly to an article describing the rabbi Shneur Kesselman in Malmö, who always wears a traditional kaddish garment in the street. Drivers sometimes lower their car window and shout "damned Jew" at him. The woman kept saying: "I as a Jew have my religion at home; he should do that too -not walk in such clothes!" (Orrenius 2013b) . This is indeed a strongly emotional response, but at the same time indicates a retreatist kind of position with regard to religious faith. It is also an example of a member of a religious minority internalizing a need to conform to a majority that is traditionally claiming a certain territory, here a secular Lutheran society.
Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking argue normatively in favour of the engagement position, suggesting that both majority and minority communities in society should strive to become "postnationalist, self-dialogical, and engaged in dialogue with a range of others. Activist, assertive, and agonistic rather than antagonistic," and concluding that "Muslims are positioned to contribute toward new cosmopolitical potentialities for a renewed pluralistic global order" (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking 2011, 196) . 4 Well aware of the wide spectrum of different interpretations of Islam and other religions, the aim of this article is to bring to the fore Muslim initiatives that aim at accommodating Islamic faith to values and practices perceived as inherently Swedish, which in turn also becomes an alteration of what it means to be Swedish. The focus will be on a few official representatives of Muslim associations, a
Muslim adult education association, and some "everyday makers" who openly refer to their
Muslim identity as a faith-based driver in order to help their fellow Muslims to identify themselves as members of Swedish society, i.e., to become socially included without losing their Muslim identity.
It is to be noted that this focus does not imply that we deny the great variety of orientations among Muslims in Sweden; we acknowledge, for example, the "silent majority"
of not so ardent believers, reports saying that 100 young men (and, on occasion, women) have Bevelander and Otterbeck (2012, 72) : "Merely the diversity of origins -national, ethnic, religious etc., -opens up a pluralism of Islams being practiced, not to mention individual preferences." There is also a generational aspect -in the long-run, second-and thirdgeneration immigrants may develop "softer" interpretations of their parents' religion, or even become secularized (Ley 2008 How do Muslim believers in Sweden perceive and react to the paradoxical Christian secular landscape? A precise answer to this question is impossible for several reasons, but most importantly because the different strands and conflicts within Islam in the country have hardly been investigated as objects of research (Larsson 2014, 116) . It is important to keep this in mind in the context of the present article, whose aim is not to discuss this diversity per se. As stated in the introduction, its deliberate focus is on representatives of Islam who, in their statements and actions, express a desire to develop an interpretation of Islam that will make it intrinsic to perceived cultural, religious and political conditions in Sweden. Precisely because of the current lack of knowledge about the diversity within Islam in Sweden, the notion of one imagined "blue-and-yellow Islam" is also questionable, as is the concept of a clearly defined "Swedish" culture [svenskhet], i.e. both notions are "empty signifiers" (Carlbom 2006 ).
Neverthless, as will be illustrated, imams representing various Muslim congregations in
Sweden are eager to declare that they take a stance of emotionally-driven, positive engagement in relation to perceived Swedish culture and politics (Larsson 2014, 117-137; Olsson 2009 ).
Muslims in a pluralist, multi-ethnic society
Over the past few decades, globalization and immigration have transformed Sweden into a pluralist, multi-ethnic society with implications for the range of faiths practised in the country (Larsson 2014; Cato 2012; Elander and Fridolfsson 2011 that have the most positive experience of the wider society" (Borell and Gerdner 2011, 968) .
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Following Abdallah Salah's argumentation, Muslims in Sweden do not place an unconditional emphasis on assimilation [assimilering] -neither is it considered essential to preserve or protect a "pure" or "real" form of Muslim identity. Instead, the task at hand involves mutual accommodation, as another of our interviewees said:
The most important goal is integration, to integrate Muslims into Swedish society.
The organization also works for Muslims to keep their identity as Muslims, in terms of culture, religion and socially. Third is that the organization functions as a bridge between the majority of Swedes and Muslims […] One should co-operate, be on speaking terms and have acceptance. Then it will be complicity; complicity creates dialogue, and dialogue means that we feel together. I think Sweden is like a boat that we are all aboard. We should unite to foster peace so that there will be a good livelihood for all of us.
What is expressed here is a desire for mutual accommodation on the part of Muslims and non- The interviewee here refers to a general discourse in society in which Islam represents the exception to the Swedish Lutheran norm and in which it is easier for an individual Muslim to be accepted as a part of Swedish society than it is for Muslims collectively.
Ibn Rushd
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The The view expressed by the former president of the Muslim Association of Sweden, a few imams interviewed and Ibn Rushd has a value basis that states that Islamic faith should be adapted to fit into the framework of Swedish society. The stated intention of the programme is to eradicate prejudice and to construct a Muslim identity within the Swedish context by emphasizing the emergence of a new Muslim peace movement. Notably, in this process, the idea of a non-peaceful Muslim movement is also implicitly recognized, which, it could be argued, is based on the same idea -that mass identity influences the public identity, to use an analogy from Relph (1976) . We shall return to this in the next section.
Speaking with forked tongue?
Any religious congregation in Sweden that receives state funding is also expected to "uphold and reinforce the basic values of Swedish society" (SST 2014, 11 Using the terminology of Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking (2011) , the official spokesmen of the Muslim community here expressed an engaged and conciliatory view rather than a dogmatic, essentialist position.
Muslim everyday-makers and attraction to place
Place is an ambiguous concept that must be interpreted in relation to different scales, actors and interests. We now move from the more or less official views of the Muslim community in Sweden down to the street-level in cities and neighbourhoods. Since different actors experience and evaluate the qualities of their environment in different ways, people's environment can take on multiple identities. Also, the identity or reputation of a place signals to the surrounding world the qualities of the place and accordingly the perceived quality of its inhabitants. Relph (1976) elaborates on the different meanings or identities of place in the eyes of people residing in a particular place and knowing it from within, and through the eyes of others looking at the place from the outside, i.e. from a physical and mental distance.
Depending on their background and personality, people make use of the place in different ways and thus experience it differently. When journalists, housing experts, researchers and others who do not themselves live in the area use the media to portray poor neighbourhoods in in powerful dark colours, stigmatization will most likely be the result. This corresponds to
Relph's "mass identity" (Relph 1976, 59 ), i.e. ready-made images, fabricated by opinionmakers, and disseminated by mass media and advertisements. Paradoxically, such mass identities can sometimes also be too rosy, created, for example, by a housing company to attract buyers or apartment tenants.
Residents usually adapt to and defend their choice of neighbourhood, and when confronted with stigmatizing images of the place where they live, put forward qualities in the physical and social environment that the outsider is not aware of. However, even if it might be expected that the mass identity has a stronger impact on the (less informed) outsider's construction of the identity of a place, a stigmatizing reputation created by outsiders may also be internalized by the insiders (Permentier, Bolt and van Maarten 2011, 835) . A physically tough or poorly built environment may convey an image of a similarly tough or poor living environment both to its inhabitants and to outsiders. On the other hand, the identity of a part of a city also builds on the social activities and interaction taking place there in places such as parks, squares, cafés, bars, etc. These amenities signal an identity of creativity and togetherness, at least between people with the same values and interests. Thus, when creating a sense of belonging and positive identification with a place, certain physical amenities can sometimes be most helpful (Burgers 2009; Lilja 2011) . As will now be demonstrated, Muslim identity can sometimes merge with place identity and produce faith-based engagement in a neighbourhood, town/city and society at large.
The everyday maker
Area-based policies targeted at multi-family housing estates have been commonplace all over
Europe (Rowlands, Musterd and van Kempen 2009; De Decker et al. 2003) . Riots and unrest in some of these areas are often classified as "hooliganism," using the same language as that used for what sometimes occurs among violent football supporters. Instead of a structural analysis being undertaking, with consideration given to racism and class-inequality, the residents themselves are victimized. 18 However, despite this gloomy picture of social life in poor neighbourhoods, engagement of a more constructive kind is also frequent, and may contribute to social inclusion and cohesion (Rowlands , Musterd and van Kempen 2009) . To this end, an engaged faith-based stance could be a positive driver. As Katarina Nylund has put it:
To be a non-Swede does not give a constructive identity, and neither does being Using this stylized framework as our heuristic tool, we shall now give some examples of Muslim everyday makers in action.
Muslim women and invisible activity
In line with Islamic tradition and practice, Muslim congregations are strongly male dominated in terms of leadership and management (Edgardh Beckman 2006, 23-24) , although Muslim women may be very active in everyday matters. 21 Thus, in Swedish multi-ethnic neighbourhoods there are many examples of Muslim women, and men, mobilizing residents in sports, cooking, language learning, music, dancing, cycling and other activities. This kind of everyday "invisible activity" has been documented by, for example, historian Klara
Folkesson in a study of Muslim women in the neighborhood of Fittja, situated in Botkyrka municipality on the periphery of the Stockholm conurbation. 22 In the local branch of Verdandi, a non-religious temperance movement with roots going as far back as 1896, longterm unemployed Muslim women were given the opportunity to participate in activities such as sewing, baking, and education in Swedish. Within their local social networks, these women experienced a sense of emotional belonging and identity, making them better equipped for life in the new country by educating and helping them with practical tasks. Moving within and between different societal arenas, they interact socially with each other in various ways, and also have influence on local politics. As Folkesson concludes, the Muslim women interviewed are:
…indeed, structurally excluded as they are stigmatized, most are unemployed, some speak poor Swedish and they all live within a suburb that is dominated by immigrants. But most of them are not passive at all, they simply move and gain personal capital in an arena that is not included in the hegemonic power structure.
They carry out what can be described as invisible activity The first quotation shows that Boualalla distances herself from an identity as an "immigrant;"
one of the positive features of Vivalla is that she "does not feel like an immigrant in this area." The last two quotations show her embracing a religious identity. In line with Nylund (2007), a religious identity here represents a positive identity construction, while being an immigrant does not.
Cosmopolitan everyday maker in Malmö
On August 27, 2013, Siavosh Derakhti, a 22-year-old Muslim, collected the first Raoul Before the award ceremony, Derakhti had a brief conversation with the organizers, quoted here at length:
How does it feel to be here today?
SD: Fantastic. Now it feels like I've made a difference. To receive support and attention in this kind of context is important in order to be able to achieve something bigger. I've worked on these issues on a voluntary basis -struggled, travelled around giving talks, paid for my own coffee.
I also work as a social worker. But on the side I have travelled round to schools and given talks to raise young people's awareness of xenophobia, antisemitism and Islamophobia. These problems are on the increase, and that scares me.
How did you start your organization?
SD: It was three years ago. It began as a school project, when I organized a class trip to a concentration camp. I didn't think we had learned enough about the
Holocaust in school. I wanted to build bridges between Jews and Muslims in
Malmö because antisemitism is a problem in the city. After that I realized how great the need was to talk about this. Now I work to combat all kinds of xenophobia.
What will the award mean to you and your organization?
SD: I want to train more people who can travel around and give talks. At the moment there are just two of us. I also want to ensure that a talk isn't the end of it -I want there to be groups, in schools and in other environments, in which people are actively working to combat xenophobia. Hopefully we can expand beyond
Malmö. There need to be more and more of us working with this, you can go far on your own but you can't take it all the way. I read that my city was described as ghetto-like, as a kind of mini-Chicago. I heard that Jews were harassed due to their faith, and felt and thought that Swedish citizens should not be mocked at due to their faith -irrespective of being Jews or Muslims.
He also says that his faith has become stronger year by year: "'them' and 'us'. That would only lead to a world of xenophobia and wickedness." His parents came to Sweden as political refugees from Iran. Although his father was educated as a microbiologist and his mother as an economist, they did not find any jobs that matched their skills. Instead, they started a shop for betting and video rental:
They have always found Sweden a fantastic country to live in, even though they
were not able to work in fields they dreamt of. Activist, assertive, and agonistic rather than antagonistic" (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking 2011, 196) .
Muslims facing everyday Islamophobia
Serious assaults with racist undertones have taken place on Muslim, Jewish and Christian congregations in Sweden (Borell 2012) . The Islamic Centre in Malmö has been the target of several attacks, involving fire bombs and pigs released into the courtyard, and in 2003 the entire Mosque was burned to the ground (Becirov 2009 ). 26 In 2010, the construction of a new mosque at Hisingen in Göteborg city started. The contractor has been subjected to several threats and boycotts and pigs' heads were placed on the building site (Svahn 2010) .
In 2009 
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Of the many reports on everyday racism targeted at Muslims in Sweden, especially women and children, we shall here briefly describe one case. Tomelilla is a municipality in southern Sweden with about 6500 inhabitants, most of them living close to the town centre.
By agreement with the central government, the municipality has received about 15 refugees annually over the last few years. However, Tomelilla like other parts of southern Sweden, is home to quite strong xenophobic sentiments, and receiving immigrants has met with loud opposition from some parts of the community. In August 2009, when a Somali woman who had escaped from warfare in Mogadishu, walking with her daughter to pre-school, passed a senior level school [högstadium], they were severely harassed by 14-15-year-old pupils, not once but more or less daily. The daughter asked:
"Why do they stone you ma? And why do they always scream things at us?" NN has no answers for her daughter, when, followed by cries of "nigger" and "pull back your curtain," they escape from the streets of Tomelilla. For more than a year, the family have been the victims of continuous hate crimes, but the police abandoned the investigation. Invectives from strangers are everyday incidents for women in scarves, as is shown by several reports. (Sydsvenskan 2011; frontpage) This quotation from southern Sweden's biggest daily newspaper well illustrates what Muslims, especially women and children, face everyday, although throwing stones is not very common. Indeed, when a stone hit this woman in the face one day, she asked the school nurse for help to investigate the case and catch the offenders -probably some school boys.
However, despite clear hints about the identity of the presumed offenders given by the headmaster of the school, the police cancelled the case. The headmaster was upset by this neglect and commented: "Honestly speaking, this is very much about the parents' values" (Sydsvenskan 2011, A10) .
A report based on interviews with 250 Muslims aged between 15 and 30 who were asked questions about their personal experiences of hatred, threats and harassment, records that nine out of ten answered that they had had such experiences. Almost all women who wear the Islamic scarf could verify this. Words such as "Easter witch," "ghost," "terrorist,"
"damned Muslims," "murderers" and "Go home!" were frequently reported (Gardell 2010 ). No to disruption policy: We do not believe in the idea of a multicultural society because this is an ideology leading to splitting, exclusion and segregation.
Multiculturalism is the idea that a state should be founded on diverse values to be accommodated to each other. We, on the other hand, mean that we shall stand up The xenophobic discourse contains few traces of racial biological thinking, but instead uses the cultural essentialist paradigm (Grillo 2003) in which an imagined existing Swedish culture is contextualized as a constant, i.e. immigration becomes a threat to "Swedish national identity and cohesion." But it is clearly not just a general xenophobic view that the party expresses, as they explicitly pronounce an anti-Muslim bias when it comes to whom to regard as worthy of integration support. When it comes to religion, the general standpoint of the party is that "one has to choose what comes first -religion or Sweden" (Jimmie Åkesson, quoted in Orrenius 2010, 10) thus stressing that national identity is more important than freedom of religion. At the same time as denouncing "religion," the party loudly supports traditional Christian practices, such as celebrating the last day of school before summer break with a ceremony held in church.
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The Church of Sweden itself is now very outspoken when it comes to issues on immigration, and cooperates with Muslim, Jewish and other religious congregations on many policy related issues, as well as on practical matters such as healthcare provision for those without residence permits (Fridolfsson and Elander 2012 
Conclusions
There is no single Muslim identity that includes all currents of Muslim faith, i.e. there is a diversity of Muslim identities. In addition, these identities are not just a product of discourses produced by the Muslim community alone, but are embedded in a hegemonic non-Muslim discourse. Drawing upon our interviews with imams and other Muslim leaders, as well as written material published by Muslim congregations, and interviews with some Muslim everyday makers, we have found evidence of a strategy of engagement, i.e. an attempt "to deal with differences through bargaining, openness toward the other, collaboration, and dialogue … Engagement implies passion and commitment and a determination to find and express one's voice" (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking 2011, 160, 193) . The attempts by Muslim leaders and everyday-makers we have described as searching for a Muslim identity in Swedish society could be seen as expressions of this stance, either in programmatic statements by the former or in earth-bound action by the latter.
In an emerging inter-religious dialogue concerning basic values, emotions and identities, While nationalists value a homogeneous definition of the Swedish nation-state, pluralist scholars celebrate a heterogeneous definition of the country. The problem, however, is that in their ideological struggle to define "Islam" and "Sweden", both pluralists and right-wing nationalists produce a false consciousness of Muslim integration. (Carlbom 2006, 246) Thus there is no linear development among Muslims in Sweden towards some unified we give the last word in the paper to a Somali woman in Scania (Skåne, southern Sweden), who has been harassed several times due to her visible Muslim identity: "I have both a strong Muslim identity and a strong Swedish identity. I feel great loyalty to Sweden. This country opened its arms to us" (Anna Ismail Abdulkarim, interview in Sydsvenskan 2011). Again the Swedish and the Muslim identities are embraced together, in contrast to the hegemonic immigrant identity spelled out by the media and others. Abdulkarim furthermore tells the reporter that her counter strategy when being harassed is trying to start a conversation and behave as a human being in the eyes of the aggressor: "Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't." Arguably, it is hard to find a better illustration of a faith-based, emotionally strong engagement spanning the levels of home and family, neighbourhood and street, city and one and severely injuring ten people using a laser-sighted handgun (Tamas 2010) . 28 Before the assault, Breivik had for some years been active on the internet urging counterjihad attacks. He saw the Norwegian state and the future potential political leaders as traitors in the battle against the alleged Islamization of Europe. Notably, the Norwegian secret service seemed to have all its focus on potential Muslim terrorist attacks, neglecting a number of hints that show with hindsight that Breivik had been planning a counterjihad attack for several years (Agrell 2013) . 29 In order to be represented in the Riksdag, a political party needs at least 4% of the votes. 30 The title of article was "The Muslims Are Our Biggest Foreign Threat" (Åkesson 2009 ).
For an extensive review of the Sweden Democrats' Islamophobic stance, see Malm (2011, 69-117) . Notably, Åkesson admits that "a substantial part of Europe's Muslims are not true to the letter, although most of the studies in this area show that the fundamentalists are a large and growing minority" (Åkesson 2009 ).
